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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose progress  continues to  be made in reducing mortality rates a t  all 
ages. What impact would this progress  have on the  size and age  composition of the 
U.S. population? 
The supposition tha t  mortality rates will continue to fall is admittedly ques- 
tionable. The view popularized by James F. Fries is that  "the median natural 
human life span is set at a maximum of 85  years  with a standard e r r o r  of less than 
one year" (Fries and Crapo, 1981). Paul Demeny, in making long-term population 
forecasts  fo r  t he  World Bank, assumes tha t  even by the yea r  2100 the re  will be no 
country with a life expectancy above 82.5 years.  
Demeny notes tha t  in some countries life expectancy seems t o  be slowly 
decreasing. The possibility of a general decline in life expectancy cannot be ruled 
out. On the  o the r  hand, as Demeny points out, "the upper  limit t o  life expectancy" 
of 82.5 years  "may yield t o  technological changes in medicine and to  changes in life 
styles, perhaps even within t he  next few decades" (Demeny, 1984). 
A s  documented by Crimmins (1981), remarkably rapid progress  in reducing 
mortality rates was made in the  United States  from 1968 to  1977. This progress  
has continued and even accelerated from 1977 to  1983. At most ages,  including 
older ages, mortality rates over  the last  decade have been declining a t  a rate of 
one o r  two percent  p e r  year .  
Hope tha t  this progress  might continue is butressed by recent  advances in the 
biological, medical, and gerontological sciences. The life sciences appea r  t o  be  
poised a t  roughly t he  point the  physical sciences were a century ago and break- 
throughs comparable to electricity,  automobiles, television, and computers may be 
forthcoming in the  areas of genetic engineering, prevention and treatment of such 
diseases as atherosclerosis,  cancer ,  and diabetes, and perhaps understanding and 
control of t he  process  of aging itself (see, e.g. Walford (1983), Bulkley (1983), and 
Rosenf eld (1976)). 
A s  argued by Manton (1982), the only judicious position t o  take, in light of t he  
conflicting evidence and theories  about the  rate and direction of future  mortality 
change, is t o  admit uncertainty. There is a chance tha t  mortality rates will con- 
tinue t o  decline a t  r ecen t  r a t e s ,  t h e r e  is a chance this progress  will level off, 
t h e r e  is a chance tha t  mortality rates will increase,  t h e r e  is a chance of some 
major breakthroughs tha t  will radically reduce mortality ra tes .  Given this uncer- 
tainty, i t  seems reasonable t o  t r y  t o  gain some understanding of t he  demographic 
consequences of alternative mortality scenarios. 
In this  note,  w e  exp lore  t h r e e  possibilities: no change in mortality rates, con- 
tinued p rogress  at two percen t  p e r  y e a r  a t  all ages ,  and a rad ica l  breakthrough 
t h a t  cu t s  mortality rates in half in t h e  y e a r  2000. Our focus is  on t h e  impact of 
such s c e n w i o s  on t h e  size and a g e  composition of t h e  U.S. population. Because o u r  
a i n  is insight and not prediction,  w e  assume t h a t  fer t i l i ty  rates s t a y  unchanged and 
t h a t  net  migration amounts t o  zero: these  simplifications avoid obscuring t h e  
effects  of mortality change with fert i l i ty or  migration change.* 
If aee-specific mortality rates s tay  at 1980 levels (and if age-specific fer t i l i ty  
rates also s tay unchanged and t h e r e  is no net  migration at any age) ,  then t h e  age  
composition of t h e  United S t a t e s  will change o v e r  t h e  coming century as shown in 
Figure 1. I t  may seem surpr is ing t h a t  no change produces  so much change: t h e  
shi f t  in the  a g e  composition resu l t s  from t h e  di f ferences  in his tor ical  levels of 
mortality and fer t i l i ty  compared with t h e  1980 levels. 
The a g e  distr ibution in 2080 peaks  at age  45. The distr ibution falls  off toward 
a p e  z e r o  because  1980 fer t i l i ty  rates are somewhat below replacement levels: t h e  
distribution falls  off a f t e r  a g e  4 5  because  of deaths.  
Compared with 1980, t h e  propor t ion of t h e  population under  age  20 dec!ines 
from 3 1  to 23 r ~ e r c e n t ,  t h e  propor t ion in the  prime y e a r s  from 20 to 64 d e c r e a s e s  
slightly f r o m  59 t o  57 percen t ,  and t h e  propor t ion above age  65 alrnost doubles 
from 11 t o  20 percen t .  Centenarians,  who numbered 24 thousand in 1980. multiply 
to near ly  210 thousand. in 2080: t h e  scarc i ty  of centenar ians  today is  a legacy of 
high mortality rates and smaller  population sizes a cen tury  ago. 
=To studp cont!nued progress  against  mortal i ty  we needed mortal i ty  r a t e s  a t  advanced ages, well 
beyond the usual stopping point of 85: we based t h e  r a t e s  we used up through 119 on Faber's (1982) 
actuarial study; a f t e r  t h i s  age we made t h e  conservat ive  assumption that  mortal i ty  r a t e s  in- 
creased by nearly nine percent per year .  A more detailed description of our methods and a more 
complete ana lys i s  of the  r e s u l t s  can be found in Cowan and Vaupel (1985). 
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Figure 1. -4ge composition of U.S. population in 1980 and in 2080 if age-specific 
mortality and fer t i l i ty  r a t e s  remain a t  1980 levels. 
Even though t h e  1980 fer t i l i ty  rates a r e  below replacement level. t h e  U.S. 
population will continue t o  grow under th i s  scenar io ,  from 225 million in 1980 t o  
254 million in 2020. A s  t h e  population ages ,  however, and t h e  reverbera t ions  of 
t h e  baby boom dampemout, dea ths  over take  b i r ths  and from 2020 t o  2080 t h e  popu- 
lation declines t o  206 million. 
STEADY PROGRESS 
Suppose mortality rates continue t o  decline at a l l  ages  at a rate of two p e r -  
cen t  p e r  ypar .  A s  shown in Figure 2, th is  s teady,  gradual p rogress  would  radical!^ 
t ransform the  a g e  composition of t h e  U.S. population in a cen tury .  By 2080, t h e  
propor t ions  of t h e  population under  20, between 6 5  and 84,  and above 84 would b e  
nbout t h e  same: c lose  to  1 9  percen t  in each case .  The population between 20 and 
64 would.  corresponding!^ decline t o  45 p e r c e n t  of t h e  total .  
Figure 2. The evolving age s t ruc ture  of L.S. population if age-specific mortalitv 
and fertility r a t e s  remain at 1980 levels. 
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.4s shown in Figure 3, these proportions imply tha t  the  ape s t ruc ture  of the  
population would be roughly level from birth t o  age 100, with a small  peak a t  age 
70. The population would f a l l  off above age  100, but i t  would not be  unusual t o  sur-  
vive t o  125 and a f e w  hardy individuals would be 140 o r  more. The total  number of 
centenarians would approach 19  million and near!y 400,000 of them would be at 
least  125. Those 400.000 will have been born before 1955: one of us (Gowan) will 
only be 117 in 2080. 
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In 1980 about one person in a thousand w a s  above age  90; in 2080 under this  
scenario,  about one person in seven would be above age 90 and more than one per-  
son in a thousand would be  above age 125. 
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Figure 3. Age composition of U.S.  population in 1980 and in 2080 if age-specific 
mortality rates decline at 2% p e r  y e a r .  
Figure 4 shows t h e  t r e n d s  in b i r ths ,  deaths.  and tota! population.size. Eir ths  
gradually decline and dea ths  inc rease  until they  meet and then  slowly decline 
toge the r :  t h e  p r o g r e s s  in reducing mortal i ty offse ts  t h e  low level  of fer t i l i ty  so 
t h a t  population size remains constant .  a t  286 million. 
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Figure 4. U.E. births,  deaths,  and total population from 1980 t o  2080 if ape-specific 
mortalitv ~ a t e s  decline a t  2% p e r  year .  
A BREAKTHROUGH 
Suppose a t  the  turn of the  millenium a breakthrough w a s  made tha t  cut  mortal- 
ity r a t e s  in half a t  all ages,  but tha t  before and after this breakthrough mortality 
rates remain unchanged. Figure 5 shows the effect on deaths,  births,  and total  
population. By 2030 deaths overtake bir ths  and the  total  population declines by 
2080 t o  238 million. A s  shown in Figure 6, the  age  s t ruc tu re  of the  population in 
2080 is intermediate between the  s t ruc tu re  with no progress  and the s t ruc tu re  
assuming two percent  annual progress.  Indeed, this age  s t ruc ture  is  similar to t he  
s t ruc ture  tha t  would emerge from steady one percent  progress  against mortality. 
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Figure 5. V.S. b i r t h s ,  deaths ,  and total  popuiation from 1980 t o  2080 if age-specific 
morta!it)r rates a r e  cu t  in half in 2000. 
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Jus t  as t h e  to r to i se  in Aesop's fable  c r e e p s  along a t  a de l ibe ra te  pace  and 
o v e r t a k e s  t h e  res t ing  h a r e ,  s teady two pe rcen t  p r o g r e s s  amounts t o  more in a cen- 
t u r y  than a one-time fifty p e r c e n t  reduction.  In fac t ,  with s teady two p e r c e n t  pro- 
g r e s s  mortality rates at e a c h  a g e  would b e  cut  to about  a n  eighth of t h e i r  original  
Level in a century .  
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Figure 6 .  Age composition of U.S. population in 1980 and in 2080 if age-specific 
mortality r a t e s  a r e  cut  in half in 2000. 
ADJUSTING TO THE NEW DEMOGRAPHY 
Whether t he re  is no fu r the r  progress  against mortality, steady progress  a t  
one o r  two percent  p e r  year ,  o r  some breakthrough tha t  substantially cuts  mortal- 
ity rates, the  age  s t ruc tu re  of the  U.S. population (and of the  populations of most 
o the r  developed countries and many developing countries) will shift  toward older 
ages. Even in t he  case of a radical breakthrough, however, the  shift  will be gra- 
dual: if death were eliminated tomorrow i t  would still t ake  a century before  t h e r e  
rrrould be many two hundred yea r  olds. So society will have time t o  adjust t o  t he  
new demography. 
Xever theless ,  i t  may b e  worthwhile to begin speculating about  some of t h e  
adjustments t h a t  might have  to b e  made, not  only to start developing t h e  wisdom 
t h a t  will b e  needed to successfully cope but also because  some c u r r e n t  decisions 
depend on long-run t r e n d s  moulding, 1965). Three  issues d e s e r v e  highlighting. 
Fi rs t ,  will increased l ife expectancy be  accompanied by increased healthy,  
product ive  l ife expectancy? Jonathan Swift, in t h e  sect ion of his  Gulltver's Trav- 
els on t h e  Luggnaggians, desc r ibes  some of t h e  p l e a s u r e s  and oppor tuni t ies  t h a t  
would open up if people  could live long, vigorous l ives and then  c o n t r a s t s  th i s  
vision with t h e  misery of t h e  immortal but dec rep i t  s t ru ldbruggs  and  t h e i r  drain on 
society.  Who would wish to l ive  to a g e  120 in, as S h a k e s p e a r e  wrote. "mere 
oblivion, sans t e e t h ,  sans eyes ,  sans tas te .  sans everything".  The evidence,  as 
reviewed by Manton (1982), i s  weak and mixed on morbidity and disability t r e n d s  in 
old age;  more r e s e a r c h  is needed. 
Second. if  t h e  span of heal thy l ife does inc rease ,  people may wish to work 
longer.  Fur thermore ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e  in t h e  propor t ion of t h e  e lder ly  may r e q u i r e  
de!aying re t i r ement  to s a v e  Social  Secur i ty  from bankruptcy.  If more  of t h e  e!d- 
er!y hang onto  t h e i r  jobs, however,  promotional oppor tuni t ies  will diminish f o r  t h e  
young and whatever gain t h e r e  may b e  in wisdom and e x p e r i e n c e  in a n  organization 
may b e  offse t  by a lack of f r e s h  thinking and new blood. In addition. t h e  inc rease  
in t h e  propor t ion of t h e  elder!y might r e su i t  in a f u r t h e r  shi f t  of political power 
and even g r e a t e r  governmental  focus  on t h e  needs of t h e   elder!^ and inattention t o  
t h e  needs of t h e  young (Pres ton ,  1984). -4 major challenge to society wil! b e  to 
develop c a r e e r  p a t t e r n s  and social  norms tha t  enable  t h e  elder!y to productive!y 
con t r ibu te  while simultaneously giving t h e  young a chance.  
Finally, what kind of education should b e  o f fe red  to a p e r s o n  who h a s  to work 
and keep  amused f o r  a c e n t u r y  or more? One bf us  (Vaupel) just had a baby 
daugh te r ,  Annz. In a r e l a t e d  a r t i c l e  (Owen and Vaupel, 1985) ,  h e r  l i fe expectancy 
w a s  f o r e c a s t  t o  b e  p e r h a p s  9 0  to 100  years .  That makes t h e  year 2080 seem a bi t  
c!oser: Anna h a s  a good c h a n c e  of being al ive then.  How should s h e  b e  educated? 
O u r  hunch is t h a t  s h e  needs  an education t h a t  enables  h e r  to k e e p  learning,  
because  society and technology will change dramatically o v e r  h e r  lifetime. In 
addition, s h e  would probably  benefi t  frorr! a solid l ibe ra l  arts education-in music, 
t h e  arts, l i t e r a t u r e ,  h is tory ,  t h e  g r e a t  books of philosophy and science-because 
th i s  background, which helps  a person  maiqtain a n  a c t i v e  i n t e r e s t  in l ife,  is  more 
readi iy  acquired in youth t h a n  in old age .  
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